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I. ImYarxdn
On October 26, 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
the United States Congress enacted the USA Patriot Act to "deter and punish
terrorist acts in the United States and around the world."' On January 9, 2002,
the Virginia House of Delegates introduced its own legislation broadening
Virginia's capabilities to respond to terrorism, and on April 6, 2002, the legisla-
tion was enacted, effective July 1, 2002.2 This legislation: (1) adds a number of
statutes defining terrorism and setting forth enforcement procedures for alleged
acts of terrorism;3 and (2) modifies sections of the Virginia Code by adding
provisions for acts of terrorism.'
1. LSA Patriot Act, Pub. L No. 107-56, 115 Star. 272 (2001).
2. Salg yH.D. 1120,2002 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 
(. 2002) (creating and modifynstatutes to adrss terrorism).
3. SaeVA. CODEANN.5 182-18 (Mlichie Supp. 2002) (allowing for accessorybefore the fact
or principal in second degree to capital murder in commission of or attempted commision of act
of terrorism to be indicted, tried, convicted and punished for capital murder); VA. CODE ANN. S
18.2-31(13) (Mlchie Supp. 2002) (adding "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of anyperson
by another in the commission of or attempted commission of an act of terrorism to definitions
of capital murder).
4. Sw VA. CODE ANN. S 182-46.4 (Mchie Supp. 2002) (defining "act of terrorism" as act
of violence as defined in Section 19.2-297.1(A)(o committed witkintent to "intimidate the civilian
population at large" or to influence conduct or activities of federal, state or local government
through intimidation). SeemtayVA. GODE ANN. SS 182-46.5,182-46.6,182-46.7, 182-46.8,
182-46.9,182-46.10,182-51.1,182-52,18.2-52.1,182-60,182-85 (lchieSupp. 2002) (classifying




The changes made byHouse Bill 1120 ("HB. 1120") affect various criminal
sections of the Virginia Code. These changes can be grouped into four catego-
ries. Sections 18.2-18 and 18.2-31 now include murder byterrorism among the
capital offenses.' Sections 18.2-46.5 through 18.2-46.7 define various other
terrorismcrimes and set forth the penalties for violations of such acts." Sections
18.2-46.8 through 18.2-46.10 define the procedural provisions for Article 2.2.'
Finally, HB. 1120 alters Section 19.2-294 and adds Section 18.2-46.10 to address
exceptions to bars on multiple prosecutions!
If. Mwder by T ,mwisn Swim 1 8.2-31(13)
Section 18.2-31 states, "The following offenses shall constitute capital
murder, punishable as a Class 1 felony... (13) The willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing of anyperson byanother in the commission of or attempted
commission of an act of terrorism as defined in S 18.2-46.4." 9 Part A, below,
defines the act of terrorism described in Section 18.2-31(13).o Part B then
analyzes the potential effects and uses of the terrorism statutes. 11
A. "A a qf Tenvrismrr
Section 18.2-46.4 defines an act of terrorism:
"Act of terrorism" means an act of violence as defined in clause (i) of
subdivision A of S 19.2-297.1 committed with the intent to (1) inini-
date the civilian population at large; or ('u) influence the coiduct or
activities of the government of the United States, a state or locality
through intimidation.
12
Section 19.2-297.1 (A)(i) defines an act of violence as anyof the following viola-
tions of Chapter 4 of Title 18.2: (a) first- and second-degree murder and volun-
tarymanlaughter under Article 1;" (b) mob-related felonies under Article 2;14 (c)
5. 55 18.2-18, 18.2-31(13); seieC ra Part III (defining and anabzing muder by terrorism).
6. SS 18.2-46.5, 18.2-46.6, 18.2-46.7; see iq% Part IV (examining other terrorism crimes).
7. SS 18.2-46.8,18.2-46.9,18.2-46.10; seeinfra Part V (examining procedural provisions for
prosecutions of terrorism crimes).
8. VA. CODE ANN. SS 19.2-294, 18.2-46.10 (Mfichie Supp. 2002); seiefra Part VI (analyzing
exceptions to bars on multiple state prosecutions).
9. S 18.2-31(13).
10. Sw irra Part IA (defining "act of terrorism").
11. S iia Part m.I (anamlyzing terrorism statutes).
12. S 18.2-46.4.
13. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-297.1(A)(t)(a) (Michie Supp. 2002).
14. S 19.2-297.1(A)()(b).
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anykidnapping or abduction felonyunder Article 3; 5 (d) anymalicious felonious
assault or malicious bodily wounding under Article 4;16 (e) robbery and carjack-
ing; 7 (f) except as otherwise provided in S 18.2-67.5:2 or S 18.2-67.5:3, criminal
sexual assault punishable as a felonyunder Article 7;18 or (g) arson of an occupied
structure or a Class 3 felonyviolation of S 18.2-79.19
B. A bsis
1. Pwg dx "A actf Temrjism
The Commonwealth must prove the defendant's involvement in the killing
and that such killing was premeditated in much the same waythat it would prove
those elements under the other forms of capital murder." Section 18.2-46.4
requires the Commonwealth to prove two additional elements in all prosecutions
under Section 18.2-31(13).1 First, the Commonwealth must prove the "act of
violence" itself.' The Commonwealth can meet this requirement byproving all
of the elements of a statutory offense in the Virginia Code or of a common-law
offense.3 The Commonwealth then must prove that the "act of violence" was
committed with at least one of two intents: (a) intent to intimidate the civilian
population; or (b) intent to influence the conduct or activities of the government
of the United States, a state or locality through intimidation. '
Z Seai,, 1 8.2-31(13) asQ0 aFdFnyMnir
Section 18.2-31(13) may require the same analysis as other capital felony
murder statutes, primarilythe willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of: (a)
anyperson in the commission of abduction "when such abduction was commit-
ted with the intent to extort money or a pecuniary benefit or with the intent to
defile the victim of such abduction; 25 (b) "any person in the commission of
robbery or attempted robbery,"26 (c) "any person in the commission of, or






20. SS=UyVA. CODE ANN.S 181-31 0Mchie Spp. 2002) (defining capitalmurder). Bse
se b#6 Pan I.B3 (analyzing exceptions to "triggermn rule").
21. S 18.2-46.4.
22. Id






sodomy or object sexual penetration;"27 (d) "more than one person as a part of
the same act or transaction;" 28 (e) "more than one person within a three-year
period." 29 The courts have previouslyruled that the Commonwealth needs only
to prove that the defendant was the immediate perpetrator, or "triggerman," of
the principal murder, the defendant does not need to be a principal in the first
degree to the predicate felony.0 The courts consider the predicate crimes to be
gradation crimes to the single act of premeditated murder, this standard means
that the Commonwealth needs onlyto prove, at a minimum, that the defendant
was an accomplice in the predicate crime, in addition to proving that the defen-
dant was the triggerman in the principal murder, in order to convict the defen-
dant of capital murder. 1 The language of Section 18.2-31(13) indicates that
terrorism will also operate as a gradation crime. If the courts follow the same
line of reasoning as theyhave in interpreting Sections 18.2-31(1), (4), (5), (7), and
(8), then the Commonwealth needs to prove only that a defendant was an
accomplice to an "act of terrorism," in addition to proving that the defendant
was the triggerman of the principal murder charged, in order to convict the
defendant of capital murder?2 In proving that the defendant was an accomplice
in the "act of terrorism," the Commonwealth must prove: (1) that the defendant
was an accomplice to the "act of violence;" and (2) that the defendant had one
of the intents described in Section 18.2-46.4."
3. Seaim 18.2-18Exoaptcn to "Trn4mnRule"
The General Assembly, however, created an additional exception to the
"triggerman rule" in Section 18.2-18 so that an accessory before the fact or




30. SeeBrileyv. Commonwealth, 273 S.E.2d 57,63 (Va. 1980) (holding that Sections 182-
31(4) and 182-31(5) do not require Commonwealth to prove that defendant was principal in first
degree to crimes of robbery or rape in charge of capital murder).
31. See , 273 S.E2d at 63; see ao Graham v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 128,130 (Va.
1995) (holding that Section 182-31(7) requires proof only that defendant was triggerman in
principal murder charged and at least accomplice in murder of additional person or persons as part
of same act or transaction); Burlile v. Commonwealth, 544 S .E.2d 360, 365-66 (Va. 2001) (holding
that Section 18.2-31(8) requires proof only that defendant was triggerman in principal murder
charged and at least accomplice in murder of additionalperson orpersons within three-year period).
32. See Bie% 273 S.E.2d at 63; Grah 464 S.E2d at 130; Bwie, 544 S.E.2d at 365-66. To
date, the courts have not specifically held that Section 182-31(1) is an exception to the triggennan
rule. However, they have stated, in dicta, that abduction may act as a gradation crime similar to
robbery or rape in which the defendant does not need to be a principal in the first degree to the
gradation crime. BMiie, 544 SE.2d at 365.
33. S& S 18.2-46.4 (stating that act of violence committed with intent to intimidate civilian
population at large is act of terrorism and that act of violence committed with intent to influence
conduct or activities of government through intimidation is act of terrorism).
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commission of an act of terrorism can be indicted, tried, convicted and punished
for capital murder.3' This provision is an addition to the "killing for hire"" or
"killing by direction or order" 6 exceptions of Section 18.2-18.17 The existence
of this provision, however, creates the potential for misuse byprosecutors, as is
examined below.3"
4. HowSeam 18.2-31 Wdl PhaUyBeApplied
RB. 1120 attempted to broaden and specify Virginia's abilityto respond to
terrorism. Although the legislation will likelyenjoy broad support and face little
objection because it addresses terrorism, it is doubtful that a prosecution for
capital murder will proceed at the state level in cases involving international
terrorism. In addition, Section 18.2-31(13) is generally redundant because all
of the felonies in Sections 18.2-31(1), (4), and (5) are "acts of violence," and
Sections 18.2-31(7) and (8) cover all multiple murders.' Prosecutors probably
will indict under these other subsections because those elements are more dearly
defined and more familiar, although they may add terrorism as a separate and
distinct capital offense."' Furthermore, the federal government is likelyto pursue
aggressivelya prosecution of anyact of international terrorism, particularlythose
involving murder. Such federal prosecution could serve as a barrier to state
prosecution.
5. PtenidMisuse by Przeutors
Prosecutors may attempt to influence a jury and appeal to its emotions by
labeling a defendant as a "terrorist." The following examples illustrate how a




37. See S 18.2-18 (stating that, except in the cases of "murder for hire," "murder by direc-
tion," or "murder by terrorism," accessories before the fact or principals in the second degree to
capital murder shall be indicted, tried, convicted and punished as though offense were muder in
the first degree).
38. See rfra Part IIB3.5 (explaining potential for misuse of terrorism statutes).
39. Such cases will depend upon, for example, intelligence information in the possession of
federal agencies.
40. SS 18.2-31(1), 182-31(4), 182-31(5), 182-31(7), 182-31(8). Infactbecause Section 182-
3 1(13) has not yet been tested in courts, prosecutors have already supplemented a Section 18.2-
3 1(13) charge with another capital offense charge. SeeFredrick Kunlde & Mfichael D. Shear, Cse
CaBdd Bmk Le*r Gmw. Sniper Sopus G6* Unr New Va. TrmurnmLam WASH. POST, Nov.
9,2002, at AS (stating that Commonwealth charged defendant with terrorism offense under Section
18.2- 31(13) and multiple- killing offense under Section 18.2- 31(8)). It is important to note, however,
that Section 182-3 1(13) is not redundant of the other sections when the Section 182-31(13) offense
is charged against an accomplice to the homicide. SeeS 182-31.
41. See S 182-31; ifra Part VI (explaining exceptions to bars on multiple state prosecutions).
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when a conviction of first-degree murder would have been the iaxinui convic-
tion attainable before HB.1120.
. "Intent to Iindate Ckiian Pq da6n"
The defendant, a white man, sets fire to the home of the only minority
familyin the neighborhood. One person in the home, the father, dies as a result
of the fire. The prosecutor proves that the arson was a willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing. Prior to -B. 1120, the prosecutor could not seek a capital
murder conviction based on these facts alone. Under Sections 18.2-31(13) and
18.2-46.4, however, the prosecutor can seek a capital murder conviction by
arguing that the crime was an "act of terrorism" because the arson was an "act
of violence" with the intent to "intimidate the civilian population at large." 42
1z "Irtrn to Irflme Ctn mwt'"
The defendant, a cityworker, attends a citycouncil meeting. Acitycouncil-
man announces his intention to introduce a budget plan that would decrease, by
a large percentage, wages paid bythe city. The defendant becomes so angrythat
he plans to shoot the councilman. The defendant executes the plan the next day
and the councilman dies instantly. The prosecutor proves that the shooting was
a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. Prior to HB. 1120, the prosecutor
could not seek a capital murder conviction based on these facts alone. Under
Sections 18.2-31(13) and 182-46.4, however, the prosecutor can seek a capital
murder conviction by arguing that the crime was an "act of terrorism" because
the murder of the councilman was an "act of violence" with the intent to
"influence the conduct or activities" of the local government through intimida-
tion.43
c AcassoryBf theFaat
In the same factual scenario detailed above, the prosecutor also plans to
bring the shooter's wife to trial. The prosecutor can prove that the shooter told
his wife about his plans and that she gave her husband her gun. Prior to RB.
1120, the wife could only be indicted, tried, convicted and punished as though
the offense were murder in the first degree. Under Section 18.2-18, however, the
wife can be indicted, tried, convicted and punished for capital murder as an
accessory before the fact to the commission of an "act of terrorism.""
42. S 182.-31(13), 182-46.4.
43. S 18.2-31(13), 18.2-46.4.
44. § 18.2-18.
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IV. Oxr Tenrism Q es
Sections 18.2-46.5 through 18.2-46.7 prohibit certain acts of terrorism and
proscribe the penalties for committing such acts.45 Section 18.2-46.5(A) states
that a person is guiltyof a Class 2 felonyif that person "commits or conspires to
commit, or aids and abets the commission of an act of terrorism" and if the base
offense of the act of terrorism maybe punished bylife imprisonment or a term
of imprisonment of twenty years or more.' Section 18.2-46.5(B) makes the
crime a Class 3 felony if the maximum penalty for the base offense is a term of
imprisonment or incarceration in jail of less than twenty years."' The "base
offense" is the underlying "act of violence" included within the act of terrorism."
Section 18.2-46.6(A) prohibits the possession, use, selling, gift, distribution, or
manufacture of a weapon of terrorism, fire bomb, explosive material, or device
and classifies such crime as a Class 2 felony.49 A person is guilty of a Class 3
felony under Section 18.2-46.6(B) if that person intends to commit an act of
terrorism under the terms of Section 18.2-46.6(A), but with an imitation or hoax
device.' Section 18.2-46.6(C) states that anyperson who, with a hoax weapon,
intends to: ( "intimidate the civilian population;" (ii) "influence the conduct or
activities of the government of the United States, a state or locality through
intimidation;" (i) compel an emergency evacuation of any place of assembly,
structure, or any means of mass transportation; or (iv) "place any person in
reasonable apprehension of bodilyharm," is guiltyof a Class 6 felony." Section
18.2-46.7 prohibits an act of bioterrorism against agricultural crops or animals
having a value of $2,500 or more through the use of an infectious biological
substance and with the intent of intimidating the civilian population or influenc-
ing the conduct of the United States government, a state, or locality, and classifies
such action as a Class 3 felony.5 2
V. Pmdxurd Pmdinrs
Venue for anyviolation of Article 22 maybe in the countyor citywhere the
crime is alleged to have occurred or where any act was committed in furtherance
of an act in violation of Article 2.2." A law-enforcement officer may seize "all












moneys or other property, real or personal... used in substantial connection
with an act of terrorism," including interest or profits derived from the invest-
ment of such money' These seizures and forfeitures are governed by the
procedures of Chapter 22.1 of Title 19.2." A violation of any section of Article
2.2 constitutes a separate and distinct offense.' If a violation of any section in
Article 2.2 violates another provision of law, a prosecution under any section in
Article 2.2 does not bar a prosecution under the other provisionY
VI. Exapom to Bar en Stawe Ptroeaion
Section 19.2-294 formerly stated:
If the same act be a violation of two or more statutes, or of two or
more ordinances, or of one or more statutes and also one or more
ordinances, conviction under one of such statutes or ordinances shall
be a bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other or others.
Furthermore, if the same act be a violation of both a state and a federal
statute a prosecution under the federal statute shall be a bar to a
prosecution under the state statute."8
RB. 1120 amends the section by adding, "The provisions of this section shall
not applyto anyoffense involving an act of terrorism as defined in S 18.2-46.4.""'
This addition affects Section 19.2-294 in two ways. First, it allows a state
prosecution for capital murder to proceed even when a federal prosecution for
the same offense has commenced. The Section creates the possibility that a
person could avoid a death sentence at the federal level, but subsequentlyreceive
a death sentence at the state level. Second, RB. 1120 permits multiple prosecu-
tions in state court for the same act for a statutory terrorism offense and any
other statutory offenses. 6° Before RB. 1120, the Commonwealth could prose-
cute for the same act in state court for a statutory offense and a common-law
offense.61





58. VA. GODE ANN. S 19.2-294 (Mlichie Supp. 2001) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. S
19.2-294 (Mlichie Supp. 2002)).
59. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-294 (Michie Supp. 2002).
60. Sw id (stating that statutory bars to prosecution do not applywhen any offense involves
act of terrorism).
61.. SeeBlythe v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E2d 796, 797 (Va. 1981) (holding that S 192-294
did not bar conviction and punishment for both voluntary manslaughter and unlawful wounding
arising from same act because manslaughter was common-law offense rather than statutory
offense).
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A violation of anysection in this article shall constitute a separate and
distinct offense. If the acts or activities violating any section within
this article also violate another provision of law, a prosecution under
anysection in this article shall not prohibit or bar any prosecution or
proceeding under such other provision or the imposition of any
penalties provided for 
thereby.P
Section 46.10 considers an act of terrorism to be a separate and distinct offense.3
As a result of this addition, prosecutors also may seek, for example, multiple
capital murder convictions for the same killing if a defendant is accused of
murdering a victim: (1) in the commission of or attempted commission of an act




Capital defense attorneys should be aware of changes in the Virginia Code
allowing for the classification of murders during an "act of terrorism" as capital
murders. Attorneys should be aware, in particular, of the ways in which HB.
1120 may"elevate" certain crimes to possible capital murder convictions through
the new definition of an "act of terrorism" Practitioners are urged to contact the






65. S 182-31(7); swPayne v. Commonwealth, 509 SE2d 293, 300-01 (Va. 1999) (holding
that defendant killing same victim in commission of both robbery and rape constituted distinct
statutory violations and permitted multiple capial convictions).
2002]

